23 Mar 2015
2.1 Symmetric Encryption Schemes:
With symmetric-key encryption, the encryption key can be calculated from the decryption key and vice versa. With most symmetric algorithms, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption, as shown in Figure 1.1. Implementations of symmetric-key encryption can be highly efficient, so that users do not experience any significant time delay as a result of the encryption and decryption. Symmetric-key encryption also provides a degree of authentication, since information encrypted with one symmetric key cannot be decrypted with any other symmetric key. Thus, as long as the symmetric key is kept secret by the two parties using it to encrypt communications, each party can be sure that it is communicating with the other as long as the decrypted messages continue to make sense.
Encryption functions normally take a fixed-size input to a fixed-size output, so encryption of longer units of data must be done in one of two ways: either a block is encrypted at a time and the blocks are somehow joined together to make the cipher text, or a longer key is generated from a shorter one and XOR'd against the plaintext to make the cipher text. Schemes of the former type are called block ciphers, and schemes of the latter type are called stream ciphers.
2.1.1 Block ciphers
Block ciphers take as input the key and a block, often the same size as the key. Further, the first block is often augmented by a block called the initialization vector, which can add some randomness to the encryption.
2.1.1.1 DES Algorithm:
The most widely used encryption scheme is based on Data Encryption Standard (DES). There are two inputs to the encryption function, the plain text to be encrypted and the key. The plain text must be 64 bits in length and key is of 56 bits. First, the 64 bits of plain text passes through an initial permutation that rearranges the bits. This is fallowed by 16 rounds of same function, which involves permutation & substitution functions. After 16 rounds of operation, the pre output is swapped at 32 bits position which is passed through final permutation to get 64 bit cipher text.
Initially the key is passed through a permutation function. Then for each of the 16 rounds, a sub key is generated by a combination of left circular shift and permutation.
At each round of operation, the plain text is divided to two 32 bit halves, and the fallowing operations are executed on 32 bit right halve of plain text. First it is expanded to 48 bits using a expansion table, then X-ORed with key, then processed in substitution tables to generate 32 bit output. This output is permuted using predefined table and XORed with left 32 bit plain text to form right 32 bit pre cipher text of first round. The right 32 bit plain text will form left 32 bit pre cipher text of first round.
Decryption uses the same algorithm as encryption, expect that the application of sub keys is reversed. A desirable property of any encryption algorithm is that a small change in either plain text or the key should produce a significant change in the cipher text. This effect is known as Avalanche effect which is very strong in DES algorithm. Since DES is a 56 bit key encryption algorithm, if we proceed by brute force attack, the number of keys that are required to break the algorithm is 2 ^{56 .} But by differential crypto analysis, it has been proved that the key can be broken in 2 ^{47} combinations of known plain texts. By linear crypto analysis it has been proved that, it could be broken by 2 ^{41} combinations of plain text.
The DES algorithm is a basic building block for providing data security. To apply DES in a variety of applications, four modes of operations have been defined. These four models are intended to cover all possible applications of encryption for which DES could be used. They involve using a initialization vector being used along with key to provided different cipher text blocks.
2.1.1.1.1 Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode: ECB mode divides the plaintext into blocks m1, m2, ..., mn, and computes the cipher text ci = Ei(mi). This mode is vulnerable to many attacks and is not recommended for use in any protocols. Chief among its defects is its vulnerability to splicing attacks, in which encrypted blocks from one message are replaced with encrypted blocks from another.
2.1.1.1.2 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode: CBC mode remedies some of the problems of ECB mode by using an initialization vector and chaining the input of one encryption into the next. CBC mode starts with an initialization vector iv and XORs a value with the plaintext that is the input to each encryption. So, c1 = Ek(iv XOR m1) and ci = Ek(ci-1 XOR mi). If a unique iv is used, then no splicing attacks can be performed, since each block depends on all previous blocks along with the initialization vector. The iv is a good example of a nonce that needs to satisfy Uniqueness but not Unpredictability.
2.1.1.1.3 Cipher Feed-Back (CFB) mode: CFB mode moves the XOR of CBC mode to the output of the encryption. In other words, the cipher text c1 = p1 XOR S_{j}(E(IV)). This mode then suffers from failures of Non-Malleability, at least locally to every block, but changes to ciphertext do not propagate very far, since each block of ciphertext is used independently to XOR against a given block to get the plaintext.
These failures can be seen in the following example, in which a message m = m1 m2 ... mn is divided into n blocks, and encrypted with an iv under CFB mode to c1 c2 ... cn. Suppose an adversary substitutes c'2 for c2. Then, in decryption, m1 = Ek(iv) XOR c1, which is correct, but m'2 = Ek(c1) XOR c'2, which means that m'2 = m2 XOR c2 XOR c'2, since m2 = Ek(c1) XOR c2. Thus, in m2, the adversary can flip any bits of its choice. Then m'3 = Ek(c'2) XOR c3, which should lead to random looking message not under the adversary's control, since the encryption of c'2 should look random. But m4 = Ek(c3) XOR c4 and thereafter the decryption is correct.
2.1.1.1.4 Output Feed-Back (OFB) mode OFB mode modifies CFB mode to feed back the output of the encryption function to the encryption function without XOR-ing the cipher text.
2.1.1.2 Triple DES:
Given the potential vulnerability of DES to brute force attack, a new mechanism is adopted which uses multiple encryptions with DES and multiple keys. The simplest form of multiple encryptions has two encryption stages and two keys. The limitation with this mechanism is it is susceptible to meet in the middle attack. An obvious counter to meet in the middle attack and reducing the cost of increasing the key length, a triple encryption method is used, which considers only two keys with encryption with the first key, decryption with the second key and fallowed by encryption with the first key. Triple DES is a relatively popular alternative to DES and has been adopted for use in key management standards.
2.1.1.3 Homomorphic DES:
A variant of DES called a homophonic DES [7] is considered. The DES algorithm is strengthened by adding some random bits into the plaintext, which are placed in particular positions to maximize diffusion, and to resist differential attack. Differential attack makes use of the exclusive-or homophonic DES. In this new scheme, some random estimated bits are added to the plaintext. This increases the certain plaintext difference with respect to the cipher text.
A homophonic DES is a variant of DES that map search plaintext to one of many cipher texts (for a given key). In homophonic DES a desired difference pattern with the cipher text will be suggested with some key values including the correct one, oppositely wrong pairs of cipher text. For a difference pattern which 56-bit plaintext to a 64-bit cipher text using a 56-bit key. In this scheme, eight random bits are placed in specific positions of the 64-bit input data block to maximize diffusion.
For example, the random bits in HDESS are the bit- positions 25, 27, 29, 31, 57, 59, 61 and 63. In this algorithm, after the initial permutation and expansion permutation in the first round, these eight random bits will spread to bits 2, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24, 26, 30, 32, 36, 38,42,44,48 of the 48-bit input block to the S-boxes and will affect the output of all the S-boxes. The 48 expanded bits must be exclusive-or’d with some key before proceeding to the S-boxes, thus two input bits into the S-boxes derived from the same random bit may have different values. This says that the random bits do not regularize the input to the S-boxes, that is, the property of confusion does not reduce while we try to maximize diffusion.
The decryption of the homophonic DES is similar to the decryption of DES. The only difference is that eight random bits must be removed to get the original plaintext (56 bits). A homophonic DES can easily be transformed into a triple-encryption version by concatenating a DES decryption and a DES encryption after the homophonic DES. Security analysis: Thus there is a probability of 1/256 between a pair of texts. The differential crypto analysis is also difficult on this mechanism. The diffusion of bits is also more in this mode. Thus this mechanism provides some probabilistic features to DES algorithm which makes it stronger from differential and linear crypto analysis.
2.1.1.4 AES:
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was chosen in 2001. AES is also an iterated block cipher, with 10, 12, or 14 rounds for key sizes 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. AES provides high performance symmetric key encryption and decryption.
2.1.1.5 Dynamic substitution:
An apparently new cryptographic mechanism [34] which can be described as dynamic substitution is discussed in the fallowing topic. Although structurally similar to simple substitution, dynamic substitution has a second data input which acts to re-arrange the contents of the substitution table. The mechanism combines two data sources into a complex result; under appropriate conditions, a related inverse mechanism can then extract one of the data sources from the result. A dynamic substitution combiner can directly replace the exclusive-OR combiner used in Vernam stream ciphers. The various techniques used in Vernam ciphers can also be applied to dynamic substitution; any cryptographic advantage is thus due to the additional strength of the new combiner.
2.1.1.5.1 The Vernam Cipher: A Vernam cipher maps plaintext data with a pseudo-random sequence to generate cipher text. Since each ciphertext element from a Vernam combiner is the (mod 2) sum of two unknown values, the plaintext data is supposed to be safe. But this mode is susceptive to several cryptanalytic attacks, including known plain text and cipher text attacks. And if the confusion sequence can be penetrated and reproduced, the cipher is broken. Similarly, if the same confusion sequence is ever re-used, and the overlap identified, it becomes simple to break that section of the cipher.
2.1.1.5.2 Cryptographic Combiners: An alternate approach to the design of a secure stream cipher is to seek combining functions which can resist attack; such functions would act to hide the pseudo-random sequence from analysis.
The mechanism of this work is a new combining function which extends the weak classical concept of simple substitution into a stronger form suitable for computer cryptography.
2.1.1.5.3 Substitution Ciphers: In simple substitution ciphers each plain text character is replaced with fixed cipher text character. But this mechanism is weak from statistical analysis methods where by considering the rules of the language, the cipher can be broken. This work is concerned with the cryptographic strengthening of the fundamental substitution operation through dynamic changes to a substitution table. The substitution table can be represented as a function of not only input data but also a random sequence. This combination gives a cryptographic combining function; such a function may be used to combine plaintext data with a pseudo-random sequence to generate enciphered data.
2.1.1.5.4 Dynamic Substitution: A simple substitution table supported with combining function gives the idea of dynamic substitution. A substitution table is used to translate each data value into an enciphered value. But after each substitution, the table is re-ordered. At a minimum, it makes sense to exchange the just-used substitution value with some entry in the table selected at random. This generally changes the just-used substitution value to help prevent analysis, and yet retains the existence of an inverse, so that the cipher can be deciphered.
2.1.1.5.5 Black Box Analysis: Dynamic substitution may be considered to be a black box, with two input ports Data In and Random In, and one output port Combiner Out. In the simple version, each data path has similar width; evidently the mechanism inside the box in some way combines the two input streams to produce the output stream. It seems reasonable to analyze the output statistically, for various input streams.
2.1.1.5.6 Polyalphabetic Dynamic Substitution: A means to defend to known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks would be to use multiple different dynamic substitution maps and to select between them using a hidden pseudo-random sequence. Thus the dynamic substitution if free from statistical attacks where each character of plain text is replaced with multiple characters of cipher text which makes the mechanism robust.
2.1.1.5.7 Internal State: Dynamic substitution contains internal data which after initialization is continuously re-ordered as a consequence of both incoming data streams; thus, the internal state is a function of initialization and all subsequent data and confusion values. The changing internal state of dynamic substitution provides necessary security to the data streams.
Thus dynamic substitution provides a probabilistic nature to the enciphering mechanism. The limitation with this scheme is, not only different dynamic substitution tables has to be maintained but also the pseudo random sequence which selects between these dynamic substitution tables has to be shared between sender and receiver.
2.1.1.6 Nonces
A nonce [29] is a bit string that satisfies Uniqueness, which means that it has not occurred before in a given run of a protocol. Nonces might also satisfy Unpredictability, which effectively requires pseudo-randomness: no adversary can predict the next nonce that will be chosen by any principal. There are several common sources of nonces like counters, time slots and so on.
2.1.1.6.1 Nonce Based Encryption: In this work a different formalization for symmetric encryption is envisaged. The encryption algorithm is made to be a deterministic function, but it is supported with initialization vector (IV). Efficiency of the user is made success of this mode. The IV is a nonce like value, used at most once within a session. Since it is used at most once having any sort of crypto analysis is practically not possible which provides sufficient security.
2.1.1.7 One-Time Pad Encryption
One more encryption mechanism for providing security to data is one time pad [13] encryption. The functions are computed as follows: A and B agree on a random number k that is as long as the message they later want to send.
Ek(x) = x XOR k
Dk(x) = x XOR k
Note that since k is chosen at random and not known to an adversary, the output of this scheme is indistinguishable to an adversary from a random number. But it suffers from several limitations. It is susceptible to chosen plain text and chosen cipher text attacks. Again the limitation is here is sharing of one time keys by the participating parties of the encryption scheme. As a new key is always used for encryption, a continuous sharing of key mechanism has to be employed by the participating parties.
2.1.2 Stream ciphers
Unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers [14] (such as RC4) produce a pseudo-random sequence of bits that are then combined with the message to give an encryption. Since the combining operation is often XOR, naive implementations of these schemes can be vulnerable to the sort of bit-flipping attacks on Non-Malleability. Two types of stream ciphers exist: synchronous, in which state is kept by the encryption algorithm but is not correlated with the plaintext or cipher text, and self synchronizing, in which some information from the plaintext or cipher text is used to inform the operation of the cipher.
Ronald Rivest of RSA developed the RC4 algorithm, which is a shared key stream cipher algorithm requiring a secure exchange of a shared key. The algorithm is used identically for encryption and decryption as the data stream is simply XORed with the generated key sequence. The algorithm is serial as it requires successive exchanges of state entries based on the key sequence. Hence implementations can be very computationally intensive. In the algorithm the key stream is completely independent of the plaintext used. An 8 * 8 S-Box (S0 S255), where each of the entries is a permutation of the numbers 0 to 255, and the permutation is a function of the variable length key. There are two counters i, and j, both initialized to 0 used in the algorithm.
2.1.2.1.1 Algorithm Features: 1.It uses a variable length key from 1 to 256 bytes to initialize a 256-byte state table. The state table is used for subsequent generation of pseudo-random bytes and then to generate a pseudo-random stream which is XORed with the plaintext to give the cipher text. Each element in the state table is swapped at least once.
2. The key is often limited to 40 bits, because of export restrictions but it is sometimes used as a 128 bit key. It has the capability of using keys between 1 and 2048 bits. RC4 is used in many commercial software packages such as Lotus Notes and Oracle Secure.
3. The algorithm works in two phases, key setup and ciphering. During a N-bit key setup (N being your key length), the encryption key is used to generate an encrypting variable using two arrays, state and key, and N-number of mixing operations. These mixing operations consist of swapping bytes, modulo operations, and other formulas.
2.1.2.1.2 Algorithm Strengths: The difficulty of knowing which location in the table is used to select each value in the sequence. A particular RC4 Algorithm key can be used only once and Encryption is about 10 times faster than DES. Algorithm Weakness: One in every 256 keys can be a weak key. These keys are identified by cryptanalysis that is able to find circumstances under which one of more generated bytes are strongly correlated with a few bytes of the key.
Thus some symmetric encryption algorithms have been discussed in this chapter. They varies from block ciphers like DES, Triple DES, Homomorphic DES to stream ciphers like RC4. To the symmetric encryption mechanisms concepts like application of Nounce and dynamic substitution are discussed which provides randomness to the encryption mechanism. This probabilistic nature to the encryption mechanism provides sufficient strength to the algorithms against Chosen Cipher text attacks(CCA). The security with all these mechanisms lies with proper sharing of keys among the different participating parties.
2.1.3 Adoptability of some mathematical functions in Cryptography:
Sign Function: [26,27] This function when applied on when applied on a matrix of values, converts all the positive values to 1, negative values to -1 & zero with 0. The advantage of using this function in cryptography is it cannot be a reversible process ie we cannot get back to the original matrix by applying a reverse process.
Modular Arithmetic: One more function that is widely used in cryptography is modular arithmetic of a number with a base value. It will generate the remainder of a number with respect to the base value. This function is widely used in public key cryptography.
2.2 Public-Key Encryption
The most commonly used implementations of public-key [13,14] encryption are based on algorithms patented by RSA Data Security. Therefore, this section describes the RSA approach to public-key encryption.
Public-key encryption (also called asymmetric encryption) involves a pair of keys a public key and a private key, used for security & authentication of data. Each public key is published, and the corresponding private key is kept secret. Data encrypted with one key can be decrypted only with other key.
The scheme shown in Figure 1.2 says public key is distributed and encryption being done using this key. In general, to send encrypted data, one encrypt’s the data with the receiver’s public key, and the person receiving the encrypted data decrypts it with his private key.
Compared with symmetric-key encryption, public-key encryption requires more computation and is therefore not always appropriate for large amounts of data. However, a combination of symmetric & Asymmetric schemes can be used in real time environment. This is the approach used by the SSL protocol.
As it happens, the reverse of the scheme shown in Figure 1.2 also works: data encrypted with one’s private key can be decrypted only with his public key. This may not be an interesting way to encrypt important data, however, because it means that anyone with receiver’s public key, which is by definition published, could decipher the data. And also the important requirement with data transfer is authentication of data which is supported with Asymmetric encryption schemes, which is an important requirement for electronic commerce and other commercial applications of cryptography.
2.2.1 Key Length and Encryption Strength:
In general, the strength of encryption algorithm depends on difficulty in getting the key, which in turn depends on both the cipher used and the length of the key. For the RSA cipher, the strength depends on the difficulty of factoring large numbers, which is a well-known mathematical problem.Encryption strength is often described in terms of the length of the keys used to perform the encryption, means the more the length of the key, the more the strength. Key length is measured in bits. For example, a RC4 symmetric-key cipher with key length of 128 bits supported by SSL provide significantly better cryptographic protection than 40-bit keys for use with the same cipher. It means 128-bit RC4 encryption is 3 x 10^{26} times stronger than 40-bit RC4 encryption. Different encryption algorithms require variable key lengths to achieve the same level of encryption strength.
Other ciphers, such as those used for symmetric key encryption, can use all possible values for a key of a given length, rather than a subset of those values. Thus a 128-bit key for use with a symmetric-key encryption cipher would provide stronger encryption than a 128-bit key for use with the RSA public-key encryption cipher.
Two large prime numbers are considered. Let them be p,q.
Calculate n = pq and (φ) phi = (p-1)(q-1).
Select e, such that 1 < e < phi and gcd(e, phi) = 1.
Calculate d, such that
ed ≡ 1 (mod phi).
One key is (n, e) and the other key is (n, d). The values of p, q, and phi should also be kept secret.
n is known as the modulus.
e is known as the public key.
d is known as the secret key.
Sender A does the following:-
Get the recipient B's public key (n, e).
Identify the plaintext message as a positive integer m.
Calculate the ciphertext c = m^{^e} mod n.
Transmits the ciphertext c to receiver B.
Recipient B does the following:-
Consider his own private key (n, d) to compute the plain text m = c^{^d} mod n.
Convert the integer to plain text form.
Sender A does the following:-
This concept can also be used in digital signing as well. The message to be transmitted is converted to some message digest form. This message digest is converted to encryption form using his private key. This encrypted message digest is transmitted to receiver.
Recipient B does the following:-
Using the sender’s public key, the received message digest is decrypted. From the received message, the receiver independently computes the message digest of the information that has been signed.
If both message digests are identical, the signature is valid.
Compared with symmetric-key encryption, public-key encryption provides authentication & security to the data transmitted but requires more computation and is therefore not always appropriate for large amounts of data.
2.3. Probabilistic encryption schemes
In public key encryption there is always a possibility of some information being leaked out. Because a crypto analyst can always encrypt random messages with a public key, he can get some information. Not a whole of information is to be gained here, but there are potential problems with allowing a crypto analyst to encrypt random messages with public key. Some information is leaked out every time to the crypto analyst, he encrypts a message.
With probabilistic encryption algorithms [6,11], a crypto analyst can no longer encrypt random plain texts looking for correct cipher text. Since multiple cipher texts will be developed for one plain text, even if he decrypts the message to plain text, he does not know how far he had guessed the message correctly. To illustrate, assume a crypto analyst has a certain cipher text ci. Even if he guesses message correctly, when he encrypts message the result will be completely different cj. He cannot compare ci and cj and so cannot know that he has guessed the message correctly. Under this scheme, different cipher texts will be formed for one plain text. Also the cipher text will always be larger than plain text. This develops the concept of multiple cipher texts for one plain text. This concept makes crypto analysis difficult to apply on plain text and cipher text pairs.
An encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: The encryption algorithm transforms plaintexts into cipher texts while the decryption algorithm converts cipher texts back into plaintexts. A third algorithm, called the key generator, creates pairs of keys: an encryption key, input to the encryption algorithm, and a related decryption key needed to decrypt. The encryption key relates encryptions to the decryption key. The key generator is considered to be a probabilistic algorithm, which prevents an adversary from simply running the key generator to get the decryption key for an intercepted message. The following concept is crucial to probabilistic cryptography:
2.3.1 Definition [Probabilistic Algorithm]:
A probabilistic algorithm [11] is an algorithm with an additional command RANDOM that returns “0” or “1”, each with probability 1/2. In the literature, these random choices are often referred to as coin flips.
2.3.1.1 Chosen Cipher Text Attack:
In the simplest attack model, known as Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) [5], the adversary has access to a machine that will perform arbitrary encryptions but will not reveal the shared key. This machine corresponds intuitively to being able to see many encryptions of many messages before trying to decrypt a new message. In this case, Semantic Security requires that it be computationally hard for any adversary to distinguish an encryption Ek(m) from Ek(m') for two arbitrarily chosen messages m and m'. Distinguishing these encryptions should be hard even if the adversary can request encryptions of arbitrary messages. Note that this property cannot be satisfied if the encryption function is deterministic! In this case, the adversary can simply request an encryption of m and an encryption of m' and compare them. This is a point that one should all remember when implementing systems: encrypting under a deterministic function with no randomness in the input does not provide Semantic Security. One more crypto analytical model is Chosen Cipher text Attack (CCA) Model. Under the CCA model, an adversary has access to an encryption and a decryption machine and must perform the same task of distinguishing encryptions of two messages of its choice. First, the adversary is allowed to interact with the encryption and decryption services and choose the pair of messages. After it has chosen the messages, however, it only has access to an encryption machine. An advancement to CCA Model is Chosen Cipher text Attack 2 (CCA2). CCA2 security has the same model as CCA security, except that the adversary retains access to the decryption machine after choosing the two messages. To keep this property from being trivially violated, we require that the adversary not be able to decrypt the cipher text it is given to analyze.
To make these concepts of CCA & CCA2 adoptable in real time environment, recently Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen defined the notion of replayable adaptive chosen ciphertext attack [5] secure encryption. Essentially a cryptosystem that is RCCA secure has full CCA2 security except for the little detail that it may be possible to modify a ciphertext into another ciphertext containing the same plaintext. This provides the possibility of perfectly replayable RCCA secure encryption. By this, we mean that anybody can convert a ciphertext y with plaintext m into a different ciphertext y that is distributed identically to a fresh encryption of m. It propose such a rerandomizable cryptosystem, which is secure against semi-generic adversaries. To improve the efficiency of the algorithm, a probabilistic trapdoor one way function is presented. This adds randomness to the proposed work which makes crypto analysis difficult.
2.3.1.2 Neural networks in cryptography:
One more technique that is used in probabilistic encryption is to adopt Neural Networks [12] on encryption mechanisms. Neural network techniques are added to probabilistic encryption to make cipher text stronger. In addition to security it can also be seen that data over head could be avoided in the conversion process A new probabilistic symmetric probabilistic encryption scheme based on chaotic attractors of neural networks can be considered. The scheme is based on chaotic properties of the Over storaged Hopfield Neural Network (OHNN). The approach bridges the relationship between neural network and cryptography. However, there are some problems in the scheme: (1) exhaustive search is needed to find all the attractors; (2) problem exists on creating the synaptic weight matrix.
2.3.1.3 Knapsack-based crypto systems:
Knapsack-based cryptosystems [1] had been viewed as the most attractive and the most promising asymmetric cryptographic algorithms for a long time due to their NP-completeness nature and high speed in encryption/decryption. Unfortunately, most of them are broken for the low-density feature of the underlying knapsack problems. To improve the performance of the model a new easy compact knapsack problem and propose a novel knapsack-based probabilistic public-key cryptosystem in which the cipher-text is non-linear with the plaintext.
2.3.1.4 On Probabilistic Scheme for Encryption Using Nonlinear Codes Mapped from Z_4 Linear Codes:
Probabilistic encryption becomes more and more important since its ability to against chosen-cipher text attack. To convert any deterministic encryption scheme into a probabilistic encryption scheme, a randomized media is needed to apply on the message and carry the message over as an randomized input [22,23]. Thus nonlinear codes obtained by certain mapping from linear error-correcting codes are considered to serve as such carrying media.
Thus some algorithms are discussed in literature which are symmetric and probabilistic in nature.
2.4 Numerical Model for data development
2.4.1 Partial differential equations: Partial differential equations to model multiscale phenomena are ubiquitous in industrial applications and their numerical solution is an outstanding challenge within the field of scientific computing [33]. The approach is to process the mathematical model at the level of the equations, before discretization, either removing non-essential small scales when possible, or exploiting special features of the small scales such as self-similarity or scale separation to formulate more tractable computational problems. Types of data ,
1.Static: Each data item is considered free from any time based and the inferences that can be derived from this data are also free of any time based aspects
2.Sequence. In this category of data, though there may not be any explicit reference to time, there exists a sort of qualitative time based relationship among data values.
3.Time stamped. Here we can not only say that a transaction occurred before another but also the exact temporal distance between the data elements. Also with the activities being uniformly spaced on the time parameter.
4.Fully Temporal: In this category, the validity of the data elements is time dependent. The inferences are necessarily time dependent in such cases.
2.4.2 Numerical Data Analysis
The following are the steps to generate a numerical method for data analysis[31,33].
2.4.2.1 Discretisation Methods.
The numerical solution of data flow and other related process can begin when the laws governing these processes are represented in differential equations. The individual differential equations follow a certain conservation principle. Each equation employs a certain quantity as its dependent variable and implies that there must be a balance among various factors that influence the variable.
The numerical solution of a differential equation consists of a set of numbers from which the distribution of the dependent variable can be constructed. It means a numerical method is equal to a experiment in which a set of experimental values gives a means of the measured quantity in the domain under study.
Let us suppose that we decide to represent the variation of Æ by a polynomial in x
Æ = a _{0} + a _{1} x + a _{2} x^{2} + …………………..a _{n} x ^{n}
and employ a numerical method to find the finite number of coefficients a1 , a2……….an. This will enable us to evaluate Æ, at any location x by substituting the value of x and the values of a’s in the above equation.
Thus a numerical method treats as its basic unknowns the values of the dependent variable at a finite number of location called the grid points in the calculation domain. This method includes the task of providing a set of algebraic equations for these unknowns and of prescribing an algorithm for solving the equations.
A discretisation equation is an algebraic equation connecting the values of Æ for a set of grid points. Such an equation is derived from the differential equation governing Æ and thus expresses the same physical information as the differential information. That is only a few grid points are represented in the given differential equation. The value of Æ at a grid point is represented by values at its neighborhood values. As more and more grid points are considered, the solutions of discritization equations reach the exact solution of the corresponding differential equations.
2.4.2.2 Control Volume Formulation.
The considered area is divided into a number of grid points each with control volumes surrounding each grid point. The differential equation is integrated over each control volume piecewise to identify the data values.
The feature of the control volume formulation is that the output dta to the control volume is equal to input data values of the control volume. It means that conservation principle is identified over the control volume. This characteristic exists for any number of grid points. Thus even the course grid solution exhibits exact integral balances.
2.4.2.3 Steady One Dimensional data flow.
Steady state one-dimensional equation is given by ¶./¶x(k. ¶T/¶x) +s =0. 0 where k & s are constants. To derive the discretisation equation we shall employ the grid point cluster. We focus attention on grid point P, which has grid points E, W as neighbors. For one dimensional problem under consideration we shall assume a unit thickness in y and z directions. Thus the volume of control volume is delx*1*1.
Thus if we integrate the above equation over the control volume, we get
( K ¶.T/¶X)_{e} – (K ¶T/¶X)_{w} + òS ¶X = 0.0
If we evaluate the derivatives . ¶T/ ¶X in the above equation from piece wise linear profile , the resulting equation will be K_{e}( T_{e} – T_{p})/( ¶X)_{e} – K_{w}(T_{p} – T_{w})/( ¶X)_{w} + S *del x=0.0 where S is average value of s over control volume.
This leads to discretisation equation
a_{p}T_{p} = a_{e}T_{e} + a_{w}T_{w} +b Where a_{e}= K_{e}/¶X_{e}
a_{w} = K_{w}/dX_{w}
a_{p}= a_{e}+a_{w}-s_{p}.delX
b=s_{e}.delX .
2.4.2.4 Grid Spacing
For the grid points the distances (dX)e and (dX)w may be or may not be equal. For simplicity we assume the grid spacing as equal on the left side and right side of grid points. Indeed, the use of non uniform grid spacing is often desirable, for it enables us to deploy more efficiently. Infact we shall obtain an accurate solution only when the grid is sufficiently fine. But there is no need to employ a fine grid in regions where the dependent variable T changes slowly with X. On the other hand, a fine grid is required where the T_X variation is steep. The number of grid points and the way they are distributed gives the nature of problem to be solved. Theoretical calculations using only a few grid points specify a convenient way of learning.
2.4.2.5 Boundary Conditions
There is one grid point on each of the two boundaries. The other grid points are called internal points, around each of which a control volume is considered. Based on the grid points at boundary, internal grid points are evaluated by Tri diagonal matrix algorithm.
2.4.2.6 Solution Of Linear Algebraic Equations
The solution of the discretisation equations for the one-dimensional situation can be obtained by the standard Gaussian elimination method. Because of the particularly simple form of equations, the elimination process leads to a delightfully convenient algorithm.
For convenience in presenting the algorithm, it is necessary to use somewhat different
nomenclature. Suppose the grid points are numbered 1,2,3…ni where 1 and ni denoting boundary points.
The discretisation equation can be written as
A_{i} T_{i} + B_{i}T_{i+1} +C_{i}T _{i-1} = D_{i}
For I = 1,2,3………….ni. Thus the data value T is related to neighboring data values T _{i+1} and T _{i-1}. For the given problem
C_{1}=0 and B_{n}=0;
These conditions imply that T1 is known in terms of T2. The equation for I=2, is a relation between T1, T2 & T3. But since T1 can be expressed in terms of T2 , this relation reduces to a relation between T2 and T3. This process of substitution can be continued until Tn-1 can be formally expressed as Tn. But since Tn is known we can obtain Tn-1.This enables us to begin back substitution process in which Tn-2,Tn-3………….T3,T2 can be obtained.
For this tridiogonal system , it is easy to modify the Gaussian elimination procedures to take advantage of zeros in the matrix of coefficients.
Referring to the tridiogonal matrix of coefficients above, the system is put into a upper triangular form by computing new Ai.
A_{i} = A_{i} – (C _{i-1} /A_{i})* B_{i} where i = 2,3……………ni.
D_{i}= D_{i} – (C _{i-1} /A_{i}) * D_{i}
Then computing the unknowns from back substitution
T_{n} = D_{n} / A_{n}.
Then T_{n} = D_{k} – A_{k} * T _{k+1} / A_{k}, k= ni-1, ni-2…3,2,1.
2.5 Key Distribution Mechanism
In most of the schemes, a key distribution centre (KDC) is employed which handles the task of key distribution for the participating parties. Generally two mechanisms are employed [ 3,8].
In the first mechanism user A, requests KDC for a session with another user say, B. Initially the KDC sends session key encrypted with private key of A, to the user A. This encrypted session key is appended with encrypted session key by private key of B. On receiving this User A, gets session key and encrypted message with private key of B. This encrypted message is sent to B, where B decrypts it and gets the session key. Now both A & B are in hold of session key which they can use for secured transmission of data. Other wise it is the KDC which sends encrypted session key to the participating parties based on the request of user.
In the second mechanism, the scenario assumes that each user shares a unique master key with the key distribution centre. In such a case, the session key is encrypted with the master key and sent to participating parties.
A more flexible scheme, referred to as the control vector [10]. In this scheme, each session key has an associated control vector consisting of a number of fields that specify the uses and restrictions for that session key. The length of the control vector may vary. As a first step, the control vector is passed through a hash function that produces a value which is equal to encryption key length. The hash value is XOR ed with the master key to produce an output that is used as key to encrypt the session key. When the session key is delivered to the user the control vector is delivered in its plain form. The session key can be recovered only by using both master key that the user shares with the KDC and the control vector. Thus the linkage between session key & control vector is maintained.
Some times keys get garbled in transmission. Since a garbled key can mean mega bytes of unacceptable cipher text, this sis a problem. All keys should be transmitted with some kind of error detection and correction bits. This is one way errors of key can be easily detected and if required the key can be reset.
One of the most widely used methods is to encrypt a constant value with the key and to send the first 2 to 4 bytes of that cipher text along with the key. At the receiving end, the same thing is being done. If the encrypted constants match then the key has been transmitted with out error. The chance of undetected error ranges from one in 2 ^{16 t}o one in 2 ^{32}. The limitation with this approach is in addition to the key, even the constant has to be transmitted to participating parties.
Some times the receiver wants to check if a particular key he has, is the correct decryption key. The naïve approach is to attach a verification block, a known header to the plain text message before encryption. At the receiver’s side, the receiver decrypts the header and verifies that it is correct. This works, but it gives intruder a known plain text to help crypto analyze the system.
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